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Corruption and College Sports:
A Love Story
by Andrea Cristiani Closa1

Abstract
College sports are a staple of American tradition, bringing in hundreds
of millions of viewers each year. Fans from all over the country root for
their team’s success and hope they will be the ones to take home the national
championship each year. Increasingly, however, college sports have been in
the public eye for a very different reason: corruption. The National
Collegiate Athletics Association’s (“NCAA”) Amateurism Rule, which
prohibits student-athletes from receiving compensation, has contributed to
this ongoing corruption. The NCAA insists upon its student-athletes
remaining amateurs, even though its own rule is damaging the integrity of
college sports. Players, coaches, and fans alike are yearning for change.
Nevertheless, the NCAA does not waiver from its Amateurism Rule.
If this corruption is to end, however, something must change. The
NCAA has to let go of its archaic rule and allow student-athletes to receive
compensation. Or, as an alternative, courts have to refuse to allow the
NCAA to hide behind its Amateurism Rule and hold it accountable under
section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Either way, if the NCAA wants the
endemic corruption to end, the only solution is to allow student-athletes to
receive compensation. Although legal issues arise from student-athletes
receiving compensation directly from their colleges and universities,
allowing student-athletes to accept endorsement deals and receive
compensation for the use of their name, image, and likeness is a solution to
this problem.
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Introduction
On September 26, 2017, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”)
arrested ten people, including four college basketball assistant coaches, as
part of an investigation into bribes(pay-for-play2) and other corruption3
occurring in college athletics.4 As part of the investigation, Louis Martin
Blazer III, working as a cooperating witness for the FBI, recorded Auburn
University’s assistant coach Chuck Person accepting a $50,000 bribe from
Blazer in order to compel student-athletes on Auburn’s basketball team to
retain Blazer’s business management services.5 The resulting criminal
complaint further alleged that University of Louisville’s head coach Rick
Pitino, one of college basketball’s most successful coaches, was suspended
for failing to supervise former staff member Andre McGee, “who allegedly
arranged for strip dances or sex acts for three players, fifteen recruits and
two coaches.”6
One year later, on October 24, 2018, a jury convicted three of those
arrested in the pay-for-play sting7 on felony charges of wire fraud and
conspiracy to commit wire fraud.8 The NCAA also stripped Rick Pitino and
the University of Louisville Cardinals of four years of tournament wins,
including their 2013 national championship win.9
Ever since its founding in 1906, the National Collegiate Athletics
Association (“NCAA”) has centered around the concept of amateurism.10 Its
current mission statement includes an exhortation that “[s]tudent-athletes

2. Pay-to-play, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition
/pay-to-play (last visited Feb. 28, 2019) (Relating to or denoting a situation in which payment
is demanded, often illegally, from those wishing to take part in a particular business activity).
3. Corruption, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com
/dictionary/corruption (last visited Jan. 17, 2019) (Corruption is defined as “inducement to
wrong by improper or unlawful means.”).
4. Mark Schlabach, The step-by-step process of how the words ‘corruption’ and
‘fraud’ came to college basketball, ESPN (Sept. 27, 2017), http://www.espn.com/mens-coll
ege-basketball/story/_/id/20834050/the-story-how-fbi-brought-words-corruption.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Mark Schlabach, James Gatto, Merl Code and Christian Dawkins found guilty in
pay-for-play trial, ESPN (Oct. 24, 2018), http://www.espn.com/mens-college-basketball
/story/_/id/25072946/james-gatto-merl-code-christian-dawkins-found-guilty-college-basketb
all-pay-play-trial.
8. Id.
9. Richard Johnson, Louisville loses NCAA appeal and becomes the 1st men’s
basketball program to have an NCAA banner taken down, SBNATION (Feb. 21, 2018, 8:31
PM), https://www.sbnation.com/college-basketball/2018/2/20/17032440/louisville-basketba
ll-2013-title-banner-stripped-taken-down.
10. Patrick McDevitt, The NCAA’s Amateurism Rules are Indeed Madness,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 2, 2018, 5:47 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/opinionmcdevitt-ncaa-amateurism_us_5a987314e4b0479c0250a58d.
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shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and their participation should
be motivated primarily by education and by physical, mental and social
benefits derived. Student participation in intercollegiate athletics is an
avocation, and student-athletes should be protected from exploitation by
professional and commercial enterprises.”11 The NCAA’s conceptualization
of amateurism is rooted in student-athletes’ playing and practicing without
compensation.12 Under the current NCAA rules, of course, student-athletes
may and do receive compensation in the form of tuition, room, and travel
expenses.13 However, student-athletes may not receive salaries or
endorsement deals, and NCAA rules prohibit them from working with sports
agents.14
The NCAA only prohibits student-athletes from profiting off of college
sports. In 2017, the NCAA made $1 billion in revenue, while studentathletes made no on-the-books revenue.15 According to the NCAA’s
expense sheet, half of this revenue was distributed back to Division I schools,
but none of the revenue went directly to the players whose labor and
intellectual property generated the money.16
This stark imbalance has led to a culture where college athletes are
receptive to under-the-table compensation (and bribes) that are technically
against the NCAA’s rules and, in some cases, against the law. College
coaches and sports agents understand that college sports are a lucrative
market from which student-athletes deserve to benefit. As a result, several
college coaches have begun paying student-athletes in pay-for-play
schemes—in other words, bribery to induce student-athletes to commit to a
certain university.17 The widespread corruption in collegiate athletics is a
direct result of the NCAA’s ham-fisted and unrealistic Amateurism Rule.
The NCAA will only change its Amateurism Rule if mechanisms exist
to hold it accountable for the rule’s harmful side effects. Part I of this Note
will look in depth at the Ninth Circuit’s decision in O’Bannon v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletics Ass’n,18 where former NCAA student-athletes brought
antitrust challenges to NCAA’s compensation rules.19 The court in
11. The Principle of Amateurism, NCAA 2018-2019 DIVISION I MANUAL.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 202-03; 233-34.
14. Id at 63-64.
15. Alex Kirshner, Here’s how the NCAA generated a billion dollars in 2017,
SBNATION (Mar. 8, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.sbnation.com/2018/3/8/17092300/ncaa-re
venues-financial-statement-2017.
16. Id. (According to the NCAA’s 2017 financial statement, $817,517,801 of its $1
billion total revenue came from the NCAA men’s basketball tournament).
17. James Gatto, Merl Code and Christian Dawkins found guilty in pay-for-play trial,
supra note 7.
18. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletics Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1052 (9th Cir. 2015).
19. Id. at 1055.
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O’Bannon reasoned that the NCAA is subject to antitrust challenges, and
held that the NCAA must allow student-athletes to be paid up to the full cost
of attendance in order to be in compliance with the Sherman Antitrust Act.20
The court stated that amateurism is a legitimate procompetitive purpose;21
this determination has allowed the NCAA to hide behind its Amateurism
Rule when faced with antitrust challenges. Part II will discuss the NCAA’s
Amateurism Rule and why it should be abolished. This part will dive into
the benefits and detriments of the NCAA’s Amateurism Rule and
demonstrate specific ways in which it is leading to corruption in colleges and
universities. Finally, Part III will outline practical solutions to the problems
caused by the NCAA’s refusal to appropriately compensate its athletes,
including changing NCAA’s rules in order to allow student-athletes to accept
endorsement deals and receive compensation for the use of their name,
image, and likeness.
O’Bannon v. NCAA and NCAA’s Amateurism Rule
The NCAA requires all of its student-athletes to be amateurs in order to
be eligible to play sports.22 The NCAA defines a professional athlete as “one
who receives any kind of payment, directly or indirectly, for athletics
participation . . . .”23 Further, payment is defined as “the receipt of funds,
awards or benefits not permitted by the governing legislation of the
Association for participation in athletics.”24 In other words, in the eyes of
the NCAA, the difference between an amateur and a professional athlete is
the receipt of payment. Under the NCAA’s current rules, student-athletes
are allowed to receive compensation for “actual and necessary expenses.”25
These expenses include things such as: lodging, meals, apparel, equipment,
health insurance, transportation, etc.26 However, these “actual and necessary
expenses” may be provided only if such expenses are for competition on a
team, for a specific event, or for practice that is “directly related” to a
competition.27 The NCAA does pay for expenses related to sports events,
but, if a student-athlete accepts or promises to accept any form of payment
that is not “actual and necessary,” then the student-athlete will lose their
amateur status and be ineligible to play.28

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 1075-76.
Id. at 1073.
Amateurism and Athletics Eligibility, NCAA 2018-2019 DIVISION I MANUAL.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Amateurism and Athletics Eligibility, supra note 22.
Id.
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Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act (“Sherman Act”) prohibits
“[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations.”29 But the Sherman Act prevents only “unreasonable
restraints of trade.”30 There are two standards used to determine whether
there has been an unreasonable restraint of trade: the rule of reason and the
per se rule.31 Restraints on compensation (like those challenged in
O’Bannon32) are usually analyzed under the rule of reason standard.33
The rule of reason restraint of trade analysis entails a three-step inquiry.
First, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the restraint on trade
causes significant anticompetitive effects on a relevant market.34 If the
plaintiff meets that burden, the defendant must produce evidence of the
restraint’s “procompetitive effects.”35 The burden then shifts back on the
plaintiff to show that any legitimate objective can be achieved through a
substantially less restrictive alternative.36 To be viable, an alternative means
must be virtually as effective in serving the procompetitive purposes, without
significantly increasing cost.37
In O’Bannon, the Ninth Circuit was confronted with the issue of
whether the NCAA’s rules prohibiting the compensation of athletes were
subject to federal antitrust laws, and, if so, whether the rules constituted an
unlawful restraint of trade.38 In this case, O’Bannon, a former University of
California Los Angeles (“UCLA”) basketball player, sued the NCAA
arguing that the NCAA’s rule prohibiting compensation of student athletes
for the use of their names, images, and likenesses (“NILs”) constituted an
illegal restraint of trade under section 1 of the Sherman Act.39 The NCAA,
in response, made three key arguments. First, the NCAA, relying on dicta,
argued that the Supreme Court in Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of
Regents of the Univ. of Oklahoma and Univ. of Georgia Athletic Ass’n,40 held
that the NCAA’s Amateurism rule is “valid as a matter of law.”41 Second,
the NCAA argued that its compensation rules were not subject to the
29. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
30. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. and Univ. of
Ga. Athletic Ass’n, 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984).
31. Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1016 (10th Cir. 1998).
32. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1055.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1070.
35. Id.
36. Id. (citing Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2001)).
37. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1074.
38. Id at 1052.
39. Id.at 1055.
40. 468 U.S. 85, 117 (1984).
41. Id.
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Sherman Act because the rules did not regulate commercial activity.42
Lastly, the NCAA argued that the plaintiffs had no standing to bring suit
because they did not suffer antitrust injury.43
First, the NCAA asserted that any antitrust challenge to its Amateurism
Rule must fail as a matter of law, because the Supreme Court in Board of
Regents had held the Amateurism Rule was presumptively valid.44 The
Ninth Circuit disagreed, reasoning that the Court in Board of Regents did not
categorically endorse the NCAA’s Amateurism Rule as being consistent
with the Sherman Act.45 Rather, the Ninth Circuit reasoned, Board of
Regents stood for the proposition that no NCAA rule should be invalidated
without conducting a rule of reason analysis because NCAA’s rules
(including its Amateurism Rule) were a part of the “character and quality of
the [NCAA’s] product.”46 The Ninth Circuit went on to opine that the
Court’s dicta in Board of Regents supports the preservation of amateurism
in college sports because amateurism is a legitimate procompetitive purpose
the NCAA can pursue.47 The Court in Board of Regents states that it is
reasonable to assume that NCAA’s regulatory controls “are justifiable means
of fostering competition among amateur athletic teams and therefore
procompetitive because they enhance public interest in intercollegiate
athletics.”48 However, the Ninth Circuit concluded that “[n]othing in Board
of Regents supports [the notion that the rule of reason was exempt from an
antitrust challenge].”49 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Amateurism
Rule’s procompetitiveness did not automatically make the Amateurism Rule
lawful, as a restraint found to be procompetitive can still be unlawful under
a rule of reason analysis if a substantially less restrictive rule would further
the same objectives.50 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that the NCAA’s
Amateurism Rule was not exempt from antitrust challenges: “[t]he
amateurism rules’ validity must be proved, not presumed.”51
The NCAA’s second argument was that its compensation rules were not
subject to the Sherman Act because they were “mere eligibility rules,” and
therefore did not regulate commercial activity.52 The Ninth Circuit began its
analysis of this issue by looking at the definition of commerce, which it

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1061.
Id.
Id. at 1063.
Id.
Id. (quoting Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 102).
O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1063.
Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117 (emphasis added).
O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1063.
Id. at 1064.
Id.
Id. at 1064-65.
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defined as “every activity from which the actor anticipates economic gain.”53
The court reasoned that, pursuant to this definition, “commerce” included a
transaction where an athletic recruit exchanges his labor and NIL rights for
a scholarship to a university because both sides expect an economic gain
from the transaction.54 The court further reasoned that the NCAA’s
compensation rules clearly regulated such transactions: a university may not
give a recruit compensation beyond a scholarship, and a recruit may not
accept compensation which is not sanctioned by the rules, or the recruit will
be disqualified and the transaction vitiated.55 Therefore, according to the
Ninth Circuit, NCAA’s compensation rules regulate commercial activity.56
The mere fact that the NCAA characterizes its compensation rules as
“eligibility rules,” does not mean the rule is not a restraint of trade subject to
antitrust challenges.57 After observing that antitrust laws could not be
avoided by “clever manipulation of words,”58 the Ninth Circuit concluded
that the NCAA’s compensation rules were within the Sherman Act’s reach.59
The NCAA’s final argument was that the plaintiffs had no standing to
bring suit because they had not suffered an antitrust injury.60 The NCAA
contended that plaintiffs had not been “injured in fact” by its compensation
rules because those rules do not deprive plaintiffs of compensation that they
would otherwise receive.61 More specifically, plaintiffs alleged that the
NCAA’s rule prohibiting compensation of student-athletes for the use of
their NILs (the only category of compensation at issue in the case)
constituted an illegal restraint of trade.62 The district court had identified
three potential markets for NIL rights: (i) live game broadcasts, (ii) video
games, and (iii) game rebroadcasts, advertisements, and other archival
footage.63 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs were “injured in
fact” as a result of the NCAA having foreclosed the market for the use of
their NILs in video games.64 The court reasoned that, absent NCAA’s
prohibitions, video game producers and other licensees, would negotiate
53. Id. at 1065 (citing Phillip Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: An Analysis
of Antitrust Principles and Their Application (4th ed. 2013)).
54. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1065.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 377 U.S. 13, 21-22 (1964).
59. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1066.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1067.
62. Id. at 1055.
63. Id. at 1067.
64. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1067 (At the time of this litigation, the NCAA no longer
permitted college sports video games to be made, and had a policy forbidding the use of
student-athletes NILs in video games.).
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with student-athletes for the right to use their NILs, just as licensees do with
professional athletes.65 Therefore, the court concluded the plaintiffs had
suffered an injury in fact, and subsequently had standing to bring the antitrust
suit.66
Having rejected all of NCAA’s primary arguments, the Ninth Circuit
turned to the merits of plaintiffs’ antitrust claim and applied the rule of
reason analysis.67 The Ninth Circuit first examined whether the plaintiffs
had shown that restraint on trade caused significant anticompetitive effects
on a relevant market.68 The United States District Court for the Northern
District of California found that a relevant market exists wherein universities
compete for athletic recruits by offering them scholarships and amenities,
such as talented coaching staff and state-of-the-art athletic facilities.69
Further, the district court found that, but for NCAA’s compensation rules,
universities would compete to offer athletic recruits compensation for their
NILs and labor.70 The Ninth Circuit deferred to the district court’s findings
of fact that the NCAA’s compensation rules had a “significant
anticompetitive effect” on the relevant market because the rules fix the price
that universities pay to secure athletic recruits.71 In other words, the NCAA’s
compensation rules fix what universities may and may not “pay” to secure a
recruit’s services. The Ninth Circuit concluded that these findings had
substantial support in the record, and therefore plaintiffs met their burden for
the first step of the rule of reason analysis.72
The Ninth Circuit then examined the second prong of rule of reason
analysis: procompetitive effects of the at-issue behavior.73 The NCAA
offered four procompetitive justifications for its compensation rules: (i)
promoting amateurism, (ii) promoting competitive balance among
universities, (iii) integrating student-athletes with their academic
community, and (iv) increasing output in the college education market.74
Once again, the Ninth Circuit deferred to the district court’s findings that the
NCAA’s compensation rules did not promote a competitive balance among
universities or increase output in the college education market, and the rules

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1069.
Id. at 1070.
O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1070.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1072.
Id. at 1070.
O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1072.
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only played a limited role in the integration of student-athletes with their
academic community.75
With respect to the NCAA’s goal of promoting amateurism, the Ninth
Circuit reasoned that a restraint could be procompetitive if the restraint
broadened choices for consumers.76 The NCAA argued that amateurism
increases choice for student-athletes because it gives them “the only
opportunity [they will] have to obtain a college education while playing
competitive sports as students.”77 However, the court reasoned that the
restraint at issue in this case (NCAA’s limits on student-athlete
compensation) did not affect choice, because a student-athlete’s choice of
college would still be available if they were paid some compensation in
addition to their scholarships.78 Namely, compensation beyond scholarships
does not limit the number of colleges student-athletes may choose to attend.
The Ninth Circuit therefore rejected the NCAA’s argument that its
compensation rules increase the choices available to student-athletes.79
Nevertheless, the district court found (and the Ninth Circuit agreed) that the
NCAA’s Amateurism Rule had the procompetitive benefit of increasing the
appeal of collegiate sports to consumers.80 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held
that NCAA’s compensation rules serve two procompetitive purposes:
integrating student-athletes with their academic community and “preserving
the popularity of the NCAA’s product by promoting its current
understanding of amateurism.”81
The Ninth Circuit concluded its analysis by examining whether there
were substantially less restrictive alternatives to the NCAA’s current
compensation rules.82 To be viable, an alternative must be virtually as
effective in serving procompetitive purposes, without significantly
increasing the cost of the operative business model.83 The district court
found there were two substantially less restrictive alternatives to the
NCAA’s current compensation rules.84 First, the universities could be
permitted to give student-athletes grants-in-aid that cover the full cost of
attendance.85 Second, the NCAA could allow schools to pay student-athletes

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id at 1072-73.
O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1073.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1074.
Id.
O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1074.
Id.
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for the use of their NILs.86 The Ninth Circuit upheld the first alternative on
the logic that allowing for up to the full cost of attendance would not frustrate
the NCAA’s legitimate procompetitive purpose of amateurism.87 Such
grants, after all, would still be tethered to education and, therefore, because
the payment was indirect, student-athletes would still be considered
amateurs.88 Therefore, the NCAA must allow colleges to pay for studentathletes’ cost of attendance.89 The court, however, rejected the second
alternative, reasoning that permitting universities to pay student-athletes for
the use of the NILs is not as “equally effective” in promoting amateurism as
forbidding them to be compensated for the use of their NILs.90 In other
words, allowing student-athletes to be compensated for the use of their NILs
would rid them of their amateur status.
Chief Judge Thomas, in a dissenting opinion, reasoned that the majority
misapplied the rule of reason analysis.91 He believes the proper inquiry
should be “whether allowing student-athletes to be compensated for their
NILs is ‘virtually as effective’ in preserving popular demand for college
sports as not allowing compensation.”92 Chief Judge Thomas’ reasoning for
this being the proper inquiry boils down to his disagreement with the
majority’s opinion as to the procompetitive interests at stake.93 He believes
that for purposes of antitrust analysis, amateurism is relevant only as it
relates to consumer interest.94 Chief Judge Thomas reasoned that the
plaintiffs are not required to show that the proposed alternatives are
“virtually as effective” at preserving amateurism “as the NCAA chooses to
define it.”95 “Indeed, this would be a difficult task, given that ‘amateurism’
has proven a nebulous concept prone to ever-changing definition.”96 The
Chief Judge goes on to state that even today’s Amateurism Rule does not fall
into a bright line rule between paying student-athletes and not paying them.97
For example, while basketball and football players are not allowed to receive
any compensation other than the full cost of attendance, a tennis player can

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
Id. at 1075.
Id. at 1075.
O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1059.
Id. at 1076.
Id. at 1081 (Thomas, S., dissenting).
Id. (Thomas, S., dissenting).
Id. (Thomas, S., dissenting).
Id. at 1081 (Thomas, S., dissenting).
O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1083 (Thomas, S., dissenting).
Id. (Thomas, S., dissenting).
Id. (Thomas, S., dissenting).
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earn up to $50,000 for playing his sport and still be considered an amateur
by the NCAA.98
The NCAA insists that fans will lose interest if student-athletes are paid.
However, this assertion is contradicted by the district court’s findings, and
by the NCAA’s own rules.99 The district court found evidence “suggests that
consumer demand for FBS football and Division I basketball-related
products is not driven by the restrictions on student-athlete compensation but
instead by other factors, such as school loyalty and geography.”100 Further,
the NCAA sold television rights to broadcast the NCAA men’s basketball
tournament to CBS for twelve years for $10.8 billion.101 Yet, the NCAA
insists that this multi-billion dollar industry would disappear if studentathletes were compensated beyond the full cost of attendance. This argument
simply does not make sense given that student-athletes do receive stipends
untethered to education, and college sports are more popular than ever.102
The majority in O’Bannon concluded that allowing students to be
paid—either by the NCAA or by third-party licensees—would take away
their amateur status, which would strip the NCAA of their legitimate
procompetitive purpose (i.e. the promotion of amateurism). Yet, this
reasoning essentially allows the NCAA to hide behind its own categorization
of its Amateurism Rule in order to avoid violating the Sherman Act. The
court in O’Bannon failed to consider the harm that the Amateurism Rule
causes to both student-athletes and the NCAA’s integrity. O’Bannon’s
reasoning enables the law and the NCAA to continue to overlook a simple
truth: if the NCAA were to get rid of its Amateurism Rule, it would avoid
antitrust challenges in the future because it would no longer be restraining
trade with its rules against compensation. The next part of this Note will
discuss why the NCAA should get rid of its Amateurism Rule.

The NCAA’s Amateurism Rule Should be Abolished
There are two main reasons why the NCAA insists its student-athletes
be amateurs—each deeply flawed. First, the NCAA’s presumption that
amateurism is an integral part of the success and popularity of collegiate
sports is unfounded or, at the very least, outdated.103 The NCAA argues that
fans “will lose interest in college sports if student-athletes are paid any
98. Id. (Thomas, S., dissenting).
99. Id. at 1083 (Thomas, S., dissenting).
100. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1082 (Thomas, S., dissenting).
101. Id. at 1083 (Thomas, S., dissenting).
102. 2015 tourney most-watched in 22 years, NCAA (Apr. 7, 2015) https://www.ncaa.
com/news/ncaa/article/2015-04-07/2015-ncaa-tournament-has-highest-average-viewership22-years (The 2015 men’s basketball tournament averaged 11.3 million viewers, an 8%
increase from the previous year).
103. The NCAA’s Amateurism Rules are Indeed Madness, supra note 10.
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amount of money that is not tethered to educational costs.”104 This argument
dates back to Justice Stevens’ dicta in Board of Regents: “[i]t is reasonable
to assume that most of the regulatory controls of the NCAA are justifiable
means of fostering competition among amateur athletic teams and therefore
procompetitive because they enhance public interest in intercollegiate
athletics.”105 Justice Stevens believed that NCAA’s Amateurism Rule
created fan interest in college athletics.106 His comment has been a crutch
for preserving the illusion of a pre-professional distinction. However, there
remains scant empirical evidence for Justice Steven’s assumption. In fact,
consumers are arguably attracted to college sports primarily for reasons
unrelated to amateurism, such as loyalty to their alma mater or affinity for
the university near where they grew up.107 Further, NCAA’s Amateurism
Rule was not in controversy in Board of Regents; therefore, no market-based
evidence108 was presented to defend this argument.109
Moreover, this argument does not hold water after the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in O’Bannon, where the court held that the NCAA must allow
colleges to pay for student-athletes’ cost of attendance.110 This cost of
attendance also includes stipends, which range from $2,000 to $5,000 a year,
with some schools offering a few thousand dollars more.111 These stipends
are untethered to educational services universities and colleges provide to
athletes.112 In other words, student-athletes are not required to spend their
stipends on education-related purchases—the occasional slice of pizza or
paying for their cell phone bill, for example.113 In addition to these stipends,
the NCAA allows monetary awards it describes as “incidental to athletics

104. Thomas Baker, Why The Latest NCAA Lawsuit Is Unlikely To Change Its
Amateurism Rules—But Should, FORBES (Sept. 11, 2018, 12:40 PM), https://www.forbes.
com/sites/thomasbaker/2018/09/11/the-economics-of-amateurism-breaking-down-the-latestlawsuit-against-the-ncaa/#210136092478.
105. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117.
106. Why The Latest NCAA Lawsuit Is Unlikely To Change Its Amateurism Rules—But
Should, supra note 104.
107. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1059.O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1059.
108. Mary Jane, What Is Evidence-Based Marketing?, CHRON https://smallbusiness.
chron.com/evidencebased-marketing-24597.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2019) (Market-based
evidence is defined as “one type of marketing where the company uses statistics, research,
tends, industry practices and customer interviews to prove the product or service works as
stated by the company.”).
109. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117.
110. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1075.
111. Chris Isidore, College athletes finally getting some cash, CNN BUSINESS (Sept. 4,
2015, 1:43 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2015/09/04/news/companies/extra-cash-college-ath
letes/index.html.
112. Why The Latest NCAA Lawsuit Is Unlikely To Change Its Amateurism Rules—But
Should, supra note 104.
113. Id.
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participation.”114 These monetary awards reward student-athletes for their
participation and/or achievements in athletics, such as winning a national
championship.115 A student-athlete on a team that won a national
championship could receive a total of $5,600 simply for participating in a
sport.116 Student-athletes have been receiving so-called cost of attendance
stipends and monetary awards since 2015, and fan interest in college sports
has not decreased over that time period.117
In fact, evidence suggests that interest in certain college sports is
increasing. The 2015 NCAA Men’s Basketball Tournament averages 11.3
million viewers, an 8% increase from the previous year; it was the most
watched NCAA tournament in twenty-two years.118 There is likewise scant
evidence to suggest that fan support would decrease if student-athletes were
allowed to accept endorsement deals or be compensated for the use of their
NILs. In fact, allowing student-athletes to monetize their NILs might
increase fan interest. The NCAA’s argument that its Amateurism Rule is an
integral part of the success of college sports does not survive close scrutiny.
The NCAA’s second justification for the Amateurism Rule is that
amateurism allows student-athletes to receive an education that they may
otherwise not.119 Basically, amateurism is the concept of being a student first
and an athlete second.120 This is undoubtedly the strongest argument for the
Amateurism Rule:
In theory, at least, college sports provided an important opportunity for
teaching people about character, motivation, endurance, loyalty, and the
attainment of one’s personal best—all qualities of great value in citizens. In
this sense, competitive athletics were viewed as an extracurricular activity,
justified by the university as part of its ideal objective of educating the whole
person.121
Arguably, however, many Division I student-athletes do not consider
the education component of college to be their first priority. As Cardale
Jones, an ex-Ohio State University football player, stated: “[w]hy should we
have to go to class if we came here to play FOOTBALL, we ain’t come to
114. In re: National Collegiate Athletic Association Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust
Litigation, No. 14-md-02541 CW, at *22 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
115. Id.
116. Id. at *22-23.
117. Why The Latest NCAA Lawsuit Is Unlikely To Change Its Amateurism Rules—But
Should, supra note 104.
118. 2015 tourney most-watched in 22 years, supra note 102.
119. Arash Afshar, Collegiate Athletes: The Conflict Between NCAA Amateurism and a
Student Athlete’s Right of Publicity, 51 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 101, 105 (2014).
120. Id. at 105-06.
121. JAMES J. DUDERSTADT, INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS AND THE AMERICAN
UNIVERSITY: A UNIVERSITY PRESIDENT’S PERSPECTIVE 70 (The University of Michigan Press,
2000).
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play SCHOOL, classes are POINTLESS.”122 Many student-athletes’ first
priority is to play sports, evidenced by many student-athletes entering
professional sports drafts when they are eligible, usually before finishing
their degree. In the 2017 National Basketball Association (“NBA”) draft,
there were twenty players who had completed just one year of college.123
Further, those student-athletes who do graduate usually graduate with
degrees that may not prepare them adequately for a competitive job market
or for post-graduate studies.124 For example, 51% of student-athletes on
Baylor University’s football team are general studies majors, while only 1%
of all other undergraduates are general studies majors.125 Student-athletes
are “routinely clustered” into “easy” or less time-consuming majors so that
they can focus on their athletics.126 Therefore, even though the NCAA
argues that student-athletes are students first and athletes second, the
evidence shows that this is fiction. Student-athletes routinely prioritize their
sport over their academics.
The fact remains that while the NCAA defends the necessity of
amateurism, NCAA’s particular definition and understanding of the concept
of amateurism have changed over the years whenever it suits the NCAA’s
needs.127 For example, the NCAA did not allow athletic scholarships until
the 1950s, because scholarships were seen as a payment.128 The NCAA later
decided that scholarships were not payments, and began allowing colleges
to award them to student-athletes.129 In 2011, a university could be punished
for providing student-athletes with textbooks.130 But as of 2015, universities
can provide student-athletes with textbooks because textbooks are now
considered part of the full cost of attending the university, which the NCAA
122. Cardale Jones (@Cordale10), TWITTER (Oct. 5, 2012, 8:43 AM), https://twitter.
com/Cardale7/status/583704108286267393.
123. N.B.A. Commissioner Is Ready for Change in ‘One-and-Done’ Rule, N.Y. TIMES
(June 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/sports/basketball/adam-silver-nbadraft-one-and-done.html.
124. Kevin Trahan, Athletes are getting degrees, but does that actually mean anything?,
SBNATION (July 9, 2014, 7:03 PM), https://www.sbnation.com/college-football /2014/7/9/
5885433/ncaa-trial-student-athletes-education.
125. Shaun Hittle, Athletes’ tendencies to ‘cluster’ in certain academic fields
problematic, some say, LAWRENCE JOURNAL-WORLD (June 15, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://
www2.ljworld.com/news/2012/jun/15/athletes-tendencies-cluster-certain-academic-field/.
126. Id.
127. The NCAA’s Amateurism Rules are Indeed Madness, supra note 10.
128. Kevin Trahan, The fall of amateurism as the NCAA knows it, SBNATION (June 19,
2014, 4:47 PM), https://www.sbnation.com/college-football/2014/6/19/5825222/ncaa-ama
teurism-mark-emmert-obannon.
129. Id.
130. Andy Schwarz, The NCAA Has Always Paid Players; Now It’s Just Harder To
Pretend They Don’t, DEADSPIN (Aug. 29, 2015, 12:25 PM), https://deadspin.com/the-ncaahas-always-paid-players-now-its-just-harder-t-1727419062.
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has lately deemed is acceptable.131 Before January 2015, universities were
prohibited from providing travel services to parents of student-athletes
because it was considered a form of payment, but now these services are
officially classified as non-payment, and therefore allowed.132 As one
reporter put it:
It was . . . pay to provide an athlete with cream cheese on his
bagel, and since pay is evil and cream cheese was pay, it appears
cream cheese was evil. But now . . . schools can give as much
food as they want, which means food, even cream cheese, is no
longer pay and this is no longer evil.133
The idea that college athletics would somehow be sullied if the
economics of the real world were allowed to impinge is also fiction. Lots of
people become very wealthy off of college sports, just not student-athletes.134
For example, college coaches are some of the highest paid employees in the
sports world. In 2018, Duke University’s head coach, Mike Krzyewski,
made $8.98 million,135 while Steve Kerr, who coached the Golden State
Warriors to three NBA championships, made $5 million last year.136 “The
commercial aspect of college athletics—television contracts and bowl game
revenue, for example—counteracts the nonprofit, amateur motives of the
organization.”137 The NCAA’s Amateurism Rule is in direct conflict with
the presence of these economic objectives, yet the NCAA does not waiver
from its purported amateurism ideals.
The Benefits and Detriments of NCAA’s Amateurism Rule
The NCAA’s practices with almost every party except student-athletes
are inconsistent with its professed amateurism ethos. Apart from the
hypocrisy of allowing administrators, coaches, and the NCAA to exploit
college athletes, there are several affirmative benefits to eliminating the

131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Kristin R. Muenzen, Weakening Its Own Defense? The NCAA’s Version of
Amateurism, 13 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 257, 262 (2003).
135. Chris Chavez, Coach K, John Calipari Top The List Of Highest Paid College
Basketball Coaches, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.si.com/collegebasketball/2018/03/01/highest-paid-college-basketball-coaches-salaries-mike-krzyewski-joh
n-calipari.
136. Richard Johnson, Steve Kerr’s about to finally get paid his worth, SBNATION (June
29, 2018, 7:53 PM), https://www.sbnation.com/nba/2018/6/29/17519872/steve-kerr-contractextension-salary.
137. Weakening Its Own Defense? The NCAA’s Version of Amateurism, supra note 134.
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NCAA’s Amateurism Rule. First, players may stay in college longer if they
were compensated.138 College basketball is notorious for the “one-anddone” rule, where players leave college after one year, coinciding with their
eligibility to enter the NBA draft. Even the NBA commissioner, Adam
Silver, acknowledges that it is a problem, “[m]y sense is it’s not working for
anyone . . . [i]t’s not working for the college coaches and athletic directors I
hear from. They’re not happy with the current system.”139 A National
Football League (“NFL”) executive also noted the problem: “[t]he college
coaches are always on us about their kids leaving early, and I tell them, until
you start paying them, they’re leaving.”140 Compensating student-athletes
might be a solution to this problem, as students will be more willing to stay
in college if they receive compensation. “Athletes might well be more likely
to attend college, and stay there longer, if they knew that they were earning
some amount of NIL income while they were in school.”141
Financial pressures at home are often so extreme that finishing college
at the expense of beginning a professional sports career is untenable. “Many
of these athletes come from urban, lower-class families and often leave
school early because of the unimaginable pressure to be the main provider
of their family at a young age.”142 If student-athletes received compensation,
then they could support their families while remaining in school to receive
the college education that the NCAA wants them to receive. LeBron James,
a three-time NBA champion, expressed his concerns with the current system,
“[m]e and my mom was poor, I’ll tell you that, and they expected me to step
foot on a college campus and not go to the NBA? We weren’t going to be
poor for long, I’ll tell you that. That’s a fact.”143 LeBron James did not attend
college, as he was not required to do so when he entered the NBA draft in
2003.144
The next benefit of getting rid of the Amateurism Rule is that
compensating student-athletes would reduce the amount of corruption now
occurring in college sports. Student-athletes are likely going to receive
payment whether it is allowed or not. By not allowing student-athletes to be
paid, the NCAA is creating a market for illicit payments, and college coaches
138. Malcom Lemons, College Athletes Getting Paid? Here Are Some Pros And Cons,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 29, 2017, 10:06 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/coll
egeathletes-getting-paid-here-are-some-pros-cons_us_58cfcee0e4b07112b6472f9a.
139. N.B.A. Commissioner Is Ready for Change in ‘One-and-Done’ Rule, supra note 123.
140. Robert Klemko (@RobertKlemko), TWITTER (Mar. 21, 2019, 12:56 PM), https://
twitter.com/RobertKlemko/status/1108819810547191809.
141. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1073.
142. College Athletes Getting Paid? Here Are Some Pro And Cons, supra note 138.
143. Dave McMenamin, Lebron James calls NCAA ‘corrupt’ in wake of scandals, ESPN
(Feb. 27, 2018), http://www.espn.com/nba/story/_/id/22596036/lebron-james-calls-ncaacorrupt-says-nba-give-alternative.
144. Id.
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have begun taking matters into their own hands and paying players as part of
the recruitment process.145 This corruption will continue as long as the
NCAA does not amend its amateurism values and allow student-athletes to
be compensated in one form or another.
There are of course a few detriments to compensating student-athletes.
The first, and strongest argument, is the fear that student-athletes will be
irresponsible with the money they earn.146 Most of Division I studentathletes are aged eighteen to nineteen and likely have no money management
skills.147 As sports commentator Colin Cowherd noted, “most 19-year-olds
(are) gonna spend it—and let’s be honest, they’re gonna spend it on weed
and kicks!”148 However, a solution to this problem may be to enroll studentathletes in money-management skill courses. Conveniently, the NCAA has
begun to develop a program for student-athletes to learn such skills.149 “So
the Division I Student-Athlete Advisory Committee has started developing
a standardized program to teach athletes how to be fiscally responsible.”150
Even without such a program, justifying a refusal to pay athletes by worrying
about their future spending habits rings hollow. Why should players not be
able to spend the money they earn in the manner they wish?
The second detriment to compensating student-athletes, is that any
compensation system would result in salary differentials for players.151 Yet,
while allowing student-athletes to take endorsement deals and receive
compensation for the use of their NILs will create uneven compensation
between student-athletes, this is acceptable because not all student-athletes
generate as much money as others:
In almost all cases, one or two sports dominate the merchandise, ticket
sales, and publicity at any college—usually football, men’s basketball, and
women’s basketball. In those situations, it’s a stretch to say that the guys on
the rugby team are owed the same money as the football players.152

145. James Gatto, Merl Code and Christian Dawkins found guilty in pay-for-play trial,
supra note 7.
146. College Athletes Getting Paid? Here Are Some Pro And Cons, supra note 138.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Brian Hendrickson, Teaching Dollars and Sense, NCAA (July 21, 2015, 10:00 AM),
http://www.ncaa.org/champion/teaching-dollars-and-sense.
150. Id. See also Online platform offer financial tips for college athletes, NCAA (Sept.
7, 2017, 11:25 AM), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/online-plat
form-offers-financial-tips-college-athletes (“NCAA student-athletes now have an online
financial awareness platform that provides them with tips on how to be more fiscally
responsible while in college, while also preparing them for financial decision that may impact
them after graduation.”).
151. College Athletes Getting Paid? Here Are Some Pro And Cons, supra note 138.
152. Daniel Roberts, Offering equal pay to college athletes won’t work, FORTUNE (Nov.
18, 2013), http://fortune.com/2013/11/18/offering-equal-pay-to-college-athletes-wont-work/.
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Further, salary inequity amongst groups of players or teammates is not
new to sports, as professional athletes get paid different salaries depending
on their skill level, so there is no reason for college athletics to operate
differently in this respect than literally every other professional sports
league.
The last detriment to compensating student-athletes, according to the
NCAA, is that compensation “incentivizes athletics over academics.”153
However, as argued earlier, many student-athletes already prioritize athletics
over education.154 The NCAA has a rule where student-athletes must be
academically eligible to play sports, i.e. student-athletes must maintain a
certain grade point average (“GPA”) in order to be allowed to play their
respective sport.155 The result of this rule tends to be a focus on eligibility
rather than education.156 Due to this incentive system, most student-athletes
opt for easy majors with a low time commitment in order to remain
technically eligible to play sports.157 Such course and major gamesmanship
hardly satisfies the spirit of the NCAA’s avowed rationale.
The benefits of getting rid of NCAA’s Amateurism Rule outweigh its
detriments. Nevertheless, the NCAA persists on its student-athletes
remaining amateurs. The problem, however, is that college sports are a
lucrative market from which many people benefit, except student-athletes.
College coaches and sports agents understand this and believe that studentathletes deserve to benefit because they are the ones who make it lucrative.
Several college coaches and sports agents have therefore taken the matter of
player compensation into their own hands and begun paying student-athletes
in pay-for-play schemes. As a result, the Amateurism Rule has directly led
to a rise in corruption at colleges and universities. As one NFL executive
stated, “[t]here’s so much money at the college level, and if the good guys
aren’t gonna pay you, then the bad guys are.”158
Corruption in College Sports
Despite the NCAA’s high-minded philosophizing, money is very much
a part of college athletics. The NCAA’s rules ignore the economic realities
and pressures many student-athletes face. Accordingly, the rules have
contributed to a thriving culture of corruption and under-the-table dealings.
153. NCAA Defends Scholarships for College Athletes, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/
about/resources/media-center/feature/ncaa-defends-scholarships-college-athletes (last visited
Jan. 22, 2019).
154. Athletes are getting degrees, but does that actually mean anything?, supra note 124.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Robert Klemko (@RobertKlemko), TWITTER (Mar. 21, 2019, 12:36 AM), https://
twitter.com/RobertKlemko/status/1108819810547191809.
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On September 26, 2017, college basketball assistant coaches from the
University of Arizona, Auburn University, University of Louisville,
University of Miami, Oklahoma State University, and University of
Southern California were implicated in an FBI investigation into bribes and
other corruption in the sport.159 Rashan Michel, a former NBA referee, and
Louis Martin Blazer III, an FBI cooperating witness, had an arrangement
where Blazer would pay Michel on a monthly basis, and Michel would
introduce Blazer to college coaches who were willing to accept bribes.160 In
accordance with this arrangement, Michel introduced Blazer to Auburn’s
assistant coach, Chuck Person.161 Blazer and Person met with an Auburn
student-athlete to discuss a $15,000 bribe to induce the student-athlete to
retain Blazer’s financial services.162 Person warned the player, “[t]he most
important thing is that you . . . don’t say nothing to nobody . . . [b]ut don’t
share with your sisters, don’t share with any of the teammates, that’s very
important cause this is a violation . . . .”163 The FBI said Blazer paid Person
a total of $91,500, which Person distributed among several of Auburn’s
student-athletes and their families.164 Person was arrested on September 26,
2017.165 His trial began on February 2019 in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York.166
Another scandal uncovered during the investigation concerned Andre
McGee, a former Louisville staff member, who allegedly arranged for strip
dances and sex acts for three current student-athletes and fifteen recruits at a
Louisville dormitory.167 Due to the scandal, on June 15, 2017, the NCAA
suspended Rick Pitino, Louisville’s head coach, for five games, and vacated
108 regular-season wins and fifteen NCAA tournament wins, including
Louisville’s 2013 national championship win.168 Less than a month later, on
July 10, a Louisville assistant coach spoke with Merl Code, an Adidas
employee, and an undercover FBI agent about covering up Adidas’ $25,000
payment to a father of a high school player who had recently committed to

159. The step-by-step process of how the words ‘corruption’ and ‘fraud’ came to college
basketball, supra note 4.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. The step-by-step process of how the words’ ‘corruption’ and ‘fraud’ came to college
basketball, supra note 4.
165. Id.
166. James Gatto, Merl Code and Christian Dawkins found guilty in pay-for-play trial,
supra note 7.
167. The step-by-step process of how the words ‘corruption’ and ‘fraud’ came to college
basketball, supra note 4.
168. Id.
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Louisville.169 According to the complaint, James Gatto, Adidas’ head of
sports marketing, had agreed to pay the recruit’s father a total of $100,000 at
the request of a Louisville coach.170
The FBI further alleged that undercover agents paid $20,000 in bribes
to Arizona’s assistant coach, Emmanuel Richardson, and $13,000 in bribes
to University of Southern California’s assistant coach, Tony Bland.171
Further, James Gatto was further implicated in a few other schemes to pay
recruits in order to induce them to commit to a particular university:
$150,000 to a University of Miami recruit,172 $100,000 to a Louisville
recruit, $90,000 to a University of Kansas recruit, and $20,000 to another
University of Kansas recruit.173 On October 24, 2018, James Gatto and
several others were found guilty on felony charges of wire fraud and
conspiracy to commit wire fraud.174 In a statement, U.S. Attorney Robert S.
Khuzami said, “[t]oday’s convictions expose an underground culture of
illicit payments, deception, and corruption in the world of college
basketball . . . [t]hese defendants now stand convicted of not simply flouting
the rules but breaking the law for their own personal gain.”175 Further, two
additional federal criminal cases involving corruption in college basketball
are scheduled for trial at the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York in 2019.176 Arizona’s assistant coach Emanuel
Richardson, Oklahoma State’s Lamont Evans, and USC’s Tony Bland are
scheduled for trial in April.177
Of course, college basketball is not the only collegiate sport to be
plagued by corruption: college football has also dealt with corruption for
decades. Former sports agent, Josh Luchs, admitted that he illegally paid
thirty college football players from 1990 to 1996.178 Luchs wrote an article
about the “inner workings of an oily business” and showed how pervasive
the illegal payments truly are.179 Further, in 2007, a sports marketer claimed
that Reggie Bush received $280,000 in benefits while playing for USC’s

169. Id. (Louisville has a shoe and apparel deal with Adidas.).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. The step-by-step process of how the words ‘corruption’ and ‘fraud’ came to college
basketball, supra note 4.
173. James Gatto, Merl Code and Christian Dawkins found guilty in pay-for-play trial,
supra note 7.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Top 5 ‘pay to play’ scandals rocking college football, THE WEEK (Jan. 6, 2011),
https://theweek.com/articles/488252/5-pay-play-scandals-rocking-college-football.
179. Id.

(2) CRISTIANI CLOSA NOTE FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2020

CORRUPTION AND COLLEGE SPORTS

11/1/2019 9:21 AM

37

football team.180 In June 2010, the NCAA sanctioned USC by imposing a
two-year bowl181 participation ban, and vacated fourteen football victories,
including Reggie Bush’s Heisman award.182 Moreover, in 2011, five
University of North Carolina football players were kicked off the team for
accepting money from sports agents.183
Corruption is endemic in college sports due in no small part to the
NCAA’s insistence on amateurism. If the NCAA cares about reforming this
culture, its first step should be to drastically amend or eliminate its
Amateurism Rule and to allow student athletes to be compensated. The
NCAA should allow student-athletes to accept endorsement deals and
receive compensation for the use of their NILs, as this would avoid a myriad
of legal issues and would bring the NCAA into compliance with the Sherman
Act.

A Practical Solution to the Problem: Allowing Student-Athletes
to Accept Endorsement Deals and Receive Compensation
for the Use of their NILs
In order to eliminate the black market for student-athlete labor,
something has to change. “In the absence of free markets for college
athletes’ services, darker and more dubious markets emerge that are an ideal
breeding ground for unscrupulous individuals to engage in schemes to
defraud college athletes and exploit their labor.”184 As discussed below,
requiring the NCAA or colleges to directly pay student-athletes is
impractical and creates legal difficulties. But, allowing student-athletes to
accept endorsement deals and receive compensation for the use of their NILs
would stem the corruption, while allowing the NCAA to avoid the
entanglements of directly paying student-athletes. Further, as mentioned in
Part II of this Note, the NCAA wants its student-athletes to remain amateurs
for two reasons: first, the NCAA presumes that amateurism is an integral
part of the success and popularity of collegiate sports; and second, the NCAA
asserts that being an amateur athlete allows students to get an education that
they may not otherwise receive.
180. Marketer claims Bush received $280K in benefits at USC, ESPN (Oct. 11, 2007),
http://www.espn.com/college-football/news/story?id=3056397.
181. “Bowls” are post-season college football games which teams qualify to play in.
182. Jim Tanner, Athletes, agents, and the NCAA: It’s time for a fix, USA Today,
https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/opinion/forum/2010-08-04-column04_ST1_N.htm#
(last visited Feb. 18, 2019).
183. Top 5 ‘pay to play’ scandals rocking college football, supra note 178.
184. Marc Edelman, Corruption Will Continue In NCAA College Basketball Until
Schools Can Openly Pay Their Players, FORBES (Sept. 27, 2017, 9:01 AM), https://www.
forbes.com/sites/marcedelman/2017/09/27/corruption-will-continue-in-ncaa-college-basketb
all/#46872cbd3315.
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As to the first point, this Note has already argued that fans are
indifferent as to whether student-athletes get paid because most fans are
primarily attracted to college sports for reasons unrelated to athletes’ amateur
status, such as loyalty to their alma mater or affinity for the university near
where they grew up.185 Furthermore, if consumers were not in favor of
college athlete endorsements, then there would be no market for companies
to hire college athletes as endorsers, because fans are the consumers of such
endorsements.186 The market for endorsements already exists, but as
presently constituted only benefits colleges and the NCAA.
The culture of corruption in college athletics does nothing to bolster the
integrity of college sports. In fact, an argument can be made that the current
system is actively undermining the public’s feelings toward college sports
and toward the NCAA in particular. Even prominent sports figures such as
LeBron James have been outspoken about their dislike for the NCAA: “I’m
not a fan of the NCAA . . . I’m not a fan of how the kids don’t benefit from
none of this . . . .”187 Therefore, allowing student-athletes to receive
compensation in the form of endorsement deals and the right to use their
NILs would decrease the corruption while still preserving the success and
popularity of college sports.
Secondly, allowing student-athletes to accept endorsements and receive
compensation for the use of their NILs would facilitate the NCAA’s goal of
incentivizing education: student-athletes would likely stay in college longer
if they were receiving compensation in some form.188 As discussed in Part
II, many student-athletes leave college to join their sports’ professional draft
once they are eligible; these athletes do so in many cases because they must.
Allowing student-athletes to receive some compensation, even in the form
of monetizing NILs, would help further the NCAA’s purported goal of
supplying an education by enabling students to remain in school rather than
creating incentives for athletes to bolt to the draft.
Finally, as discussed below, allowing student-athletes to accept
endorsement deals and receive compensation for the use of their NILs is a
more practical solution that the NCAA’s or individual university’s paying
student-athletes because this practice would avoid legal issues including

185. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1059.
186. Marc Edelman, 9 Reasons To Allow College Athletes To License Their Names,
Images and Likeness, FORBES (May 11, 2018, 8:59 AM), https://www.forbes.com/si
tes/marcedelman/2018/05/11/9-reasons-to-allow-college-athletes-to-license-their-namesimages-and-likenesses/#729dd2ca5488.
187. Cuck Schilken, LeBron James is no fan of college basketball: ‘The NCAA is
corrupt’, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2018, 12:00 PM), https://www.latimes.com/sports/sportsn
ow/la-sp-lebron-james-ncaa-20180227-story.html.
188. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1073.
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Title IX violations, vicarious liability, and comply with the governing
jurisprudent of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Title IX, Employment Liability Considerations, and the Sherman Act
Title IX states, “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subject
to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance . . . .”189 At its inception the NCAA, which received
federal financial assistance through the statute, contested Title IX’s
application to college athletics.190 But in 1987, Congress amended the law
to require Title IX to apply to all of an institution’s programs, including
athletics that do not directly receive federal funds.191
In Cohen v. Brown Univ.,192 the First Circuit held that a school must
meet one of three requirements in order to comply with Title IX.193 First,
schools may provide athletic participation opportunities for male and female
students “in numbers substantially proportionate to their respective
enrollments.”194 Second, if a gender is or has been underrepresented among
student-athletes, the school may show that it has a continuing practice of
striving for equal athletic opportunities between both genders.195 Finally, if
a school cannot meet the first or second requirements, then it must
demonstrate “that the interests and abilities of the members of that sex have
been fully and effectively accommodated by the present program.”196 In
short, schools must provide female and male student-athletes equal athletic
opportunities and must give equal treatment to both genders.
If the Director of the Office for Civil Rights of the Department of Health
and Human Services finds that a school which receives federal funds has
discriminated against persons on the basis of their sex, the school “must take
such remedial action as the Director deems necessary to overcome the effects
of the discrimination.”197 Furthermore, violating Title IX leaves schools
open to possible litigation from those discriminated against, which could end
up costing the school a lot of money. The National Center for Higher
Education Risk Management has found that the average jury award in Title

189. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2019).
190. Erin Buzuvis, Athletic Compensation for Women Too? Title IX Implications of
Northwestern and O’Bannon, 41 J.C. & U.L. 297, 322 (2015).
191. Id.
192. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996).
193. Id. at 166.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. 15 Am. Jur. 2d Civil Rights § 356 (2019).
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IX cases is about $200,000.198 Some courts have awarded up to $4.52 million
plus legal fees to Title IX plaintiffs.199 Therefore, a violation of Title IX
could prove to be costly for schools.
Requiring colleges to pay student-athletes directly would create Title
IX problems, because colleges would be forced to give equal pay to all
student-athletes. Under Title IX, schools are already required to distribute
athletic-based financial aid proportionally among female and male studentathletes.200 Under current jurisprudence, therefore, schools would be
required to give proportional pay to both female and male student-athletes.
This would create financial problems for colleges and universities, because
there would not be enough of a cash reservoir to pay all student-athletes
equally while maintaining all athletic programs.201 Although Division I
universities generate millions of dollars from their men’s football and
basketball programs, universities use this money to fund other non-profitable
sports, usually female sports.202 If universities were required to pay all
student-athletes equally, universities would be forced to cut some of these
non-profitable programs, which could cause a Title IX problem as equal
opportunities would not be offered to both female and male student-athletes.
Allowing student-athletes to accept endorsement deals and receive
compensation for the use of their NILs would not violate Title IX, because
schools would not be paying student-athletes directly or indirectly. “The
endorsement plan does not create an environment where schools treat
women’s sports unfairly because it does not require schools to compensate
athletes unequally, as the endorsement plan excludes participation of
schools.”203
Furthermore, by allowing student-athletes to accept
endorsement deals and receive compensation for the use of their NILs, the
NCAA is creating equal opportunities for both genders as female and male
student-athletes would be able to accept endorsement deals and receive
compensation for the use of their NILs. “Because it’s a plan that would allow
notable student-athletes to essentially get whatever somebody believes

198. Robin Hattersley-Gray, Not Complying with Title IX Could Cost You, CAMPUS
SAFETY (June 3, 2012), https://www.campussafetymagazine.com/university/not-complyingwith-title-ix-could-cost-you/.
199. Brian L. Porto, Halfway Home: An Update on Title IX and College Sports, 34-SUM
VT. B.J. 28, 32 (2008).
200. Athletic Compensation for Women Too? Title IX Implications of Northwestern and
O’Bannon, supra note 190 at 324.
201. Michael A. Corgan, Permitting Student-Athletes to Accept Endorsement Deals: A
Solution to the Financial Corruption of College Athletics Created By Unethical Sports Agents
and the NCAA’s Revenue-Generating Scheme, 19 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 371, 407-08
(2012).
202. Id. at 406.
203. Id. at 420.
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they’re worth, and it would neither be a financial strain on universities nor a
Title IX nightmare.”204
In addition to complying with Title IX, allowing student-athletes to
accept endorsement deals and receive compensation for the use of their NILs
also protects universities from being vicariously liable for their studentathletes’ actions. The doctrine of respondeat superior states that an
employer is subject to liability (i.e. vicariously liable) for the acts of his
employees committed while acting in the scope of their employment.205 An
employee is defined as: “[s]omeone who works in the service of another
person (the employer) under an express or implied contract of hire, under
which the employer has the right to control the details of work
performance.”206 Scope of employment is defined as: “[t]he range of
reasonable and foreseeable activities that an employee engages in while
carrying out the employer’s business . . . .”207 An employer is not
vicariously liable for torts committed by an employee acting outside the
scope of employment, unless the employer was negligent or reckless.208 An
employer is, however, liable for torts committed by an employee acting
within the scope of their employment.209 Moreover, an employer is liable on
a contract between their employee and a third party when the employee acts
with actual, apparent, or inherent authority.210
If student-athletes receive a salary from their colleges or from the
NCAA, they will likely be classified as employees of the school. This means
that, within certain parameters, a school or the NCAA may be liable for the
student-athlete’s actions. This potential liability is understandably a
frightening prospect for schools and the NCAA, given patterns of studentathlete misbehavior. For example, an ex-Duke University basketball player
is being accused of sexual assault, which allegedly occurred in 1999 while
the player was a student there.211 If this player was paid by and therefore
considered an employee of Duke, and committed torts considered within the
scope of his employment or the university was found to be negligent, then
the university could be vicariously liable for this student-athlete’s actions.
204. Gary Parrish, Everybody wins if the NCAA will allow players to accept
endorsements, CBS SPORTS (Apr. 12, 2016, 9:28 AM), https://www.cbssports.com/collegebasketball/news/everybody-wins-if-the-ncaa-will-allow-players-to-accept-endorsements/.
205. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219.
206. Employee, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
207. Scope of Employment, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
208. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219.
209. Id.
210. Id. § 140.
211. A.J. Perez, Coach K says he had ‘no knowledge’ of alleged 1999 sexual assault
linked to Duke player, USA TODAY (Feb. 9, 2019, 10:02 PM), https://www.usatoday.com
/story/sports/ncaab/2019/02/09/duke-mike-krzyzewski-no-knowledge-ex-player-rape-allegat
ion/2827702002/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2019).

(2) CRISTIANI CLOSA NOTE FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELECT)

42

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

11/1/2019 9:21 AM

42.1

This means the university could face timely and costly legal proceedings. It
is not difficult to imagine a situation where a student-athlete commits a
criminal or civil infraction on a team road trip or at a team party. These kinds
of stories happen often, and it’s important to shield colleges from this type
of liability.
Allowing student-athletes to accept endorsement deals and receive
compensation for the use of their NILs would circumvent the problem of
vicarious liability. Further, as student-athletes would not be considered
employees of their schools, “colleges and universities would avoid any type
of workers’ compensation payments or collective bargaining agreements that
could arise if the student-athletes were wage earners.”212
Lastly, allowing student-athletes to accept endorsement deals and
receive compensation for the use of their NILs would likely comply with the
current section 1 of the Sherman Act jurisprudence. The court in O’Bannon
reasoned that amateurism is a legitimate procompetitive purpose and that is
why the NCAA’s current anti-compensation rules do not violate the Sherman
Act.213 The proposed solution would virtually eliminate the NCAA’s
Amateurism Rule because student-athletes would receive “pay” which rids
them of their amateur status. Nevertheless, the NCAA would be in
compliance with the Sherman Act because it would no longer be restraining
trade. Under its current rules, the NCAA is restraining trade because it does
not allow student-athletes to be compensated for their labor. Therefore, if
the NCAA allowed student-athletes to be compensated, it would no longer
be restraining trade, and subsequently, there would no longer be an antitrust
violation.

Conclusion
NCAA’s Amateurism Rule has a long, complicated history. The
NCAA firmly believes that its student-athletes should remain amateurs, and
while that made sense thirty years ago, it does not make sense now. Last
year alone, the NCAA made a billion dollars in revenue, and none of it went
directly to the student-athletes whose labor made the money.214 Corruption
has ensued at colleges and universities due to the NCAA’s persistence that
its student-athletes remain amateurs. The NCAA argues that if it eliminates
its Amateurism Rule, fans will lose interest in college sports.215 Arguably,
however, the ongoing corruption and scandals are already damaging the
integrity of college sports. Therefore, the best solution to all involved would

212. Corgan, supra note 201, at 420-21.
213. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1073.
214. Here’s how the NCAA generate a billion dollars in 2017, supra note 15.
215. Why The Latest NCAA Lawsuit Is Unlikely To Change Its Amateurism Rules—But
Should, supra note 104.

(2) CRISTIANI CLOSA NOTE FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2020

11/1/2019 9:21 AM

CORRUPTION AND COLLEGE SPORTS

43

be for the NCAA to allow student-athletes to accept endorsement deals and
receive compensation for the use of their NILs.
Moreover, the NCAA once again finds itself in litigation (In Re: Nat’l
Collegiate Athletics Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litigation216)
defending against antitrust challenges to its compensation rules. The
plaintiff student-athletes are arguing that limiting their compensation
prevents colleges from competing against one another.217 On March 8, 2019,
Judge Wilken, applying the antitrust rule of reason analysis, found that the
challenged practices did have significant anticompetitive effects because
greater compensation would be offered in the recruitment of student-athletes
but for these restrictions.218 Many people argue that the court’s holding in
O’Bannon precludes student-athletes from receiving compensation for the
use of their NILs. However, O’Bannon does not present a hurdle for this
litigation or congressional action:
The O’Bannon case did not implement an outright ban of
compensation beyond a full scholarship, and it misapplied the
Rule of Reason balancing test. Although the Supreme Court has
not accepted an appeal, this case would neither prohibit a future
ruling in favor of an amendment to the NCAA’s amateurism
regulation, nor would it place any burden on Congress should
Congress decide to implement a bill that amended the
regulation.219
On March 22, 2019, the NCAA filed a notice of appeal to the Ninth
Circuit.220 This allows the Ninth Circuit to revisit its ruling in O’Bannon
and, hopefully, hold that the NCAA is violating section 1 of the Sherman
Act by restricting compensation.
Nevertheless, on September 11, 2019, the California legislature passed
Senate Bill 206, which allows California universities to compensate studentathletes for the use of the NILs.221 The NCAA sent Governor Gavin Newsom
a letter stating that this bill “would wipe out the distinction between college

216. 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2019)
217. Id. at 1062.
218. Id. at 1110.
219. Dalton Thacker, Amateurism vs. Capitalism: A Practical Approach to Paying
College Athletes, 16 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 183, 195 (2017).
220. In Re: Nat’l Collegiate Athletics Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust
Litigation, No. 4:14-md-02541-CW, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (The NCAA filed a notice of
appeal to the Ninth Circuit).
221. SB-206 Collegiate athletics: student athlete compensation and representation,
CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE INFORMATION (Sept. 14, 2019, 4:00 AM), https://leginfo.legis
lature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200SB206.
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and professional sports . . . .”222 While California schools are not required to
compensate student-athletes for the use of their NILs under Senate Bill 206,
this new development definitely puts pressure on the NCAA to reconsider
their Amateurism Rule.
In a shocking turn of events, on October 29, 2019, the NCAA’s Board
of Governors unanimously voted to permit student-athletes to profit from the
use of their NILs.223 While the NCAA has not stated how this will function
with its current Amateurism Rule, NCAA President Mark Emmert stated that
student-athletes will remain “students and not professionals.”224 Therefore,
it is likely the NCAA will retain its Amateurism Rule and simply state that
compensation based on the use of student-athletes’ NILs is no longer
considered pay under its compensation rules. As stated earlier, the NCAA
has changed what is considered “pay” in the past without abolishing its
Amateurism Rule (e.g. student-athletes were not allowed to receive
scholarships because it was considered “pay”).225 However, as long as the
NCAA keeps its Amateurism Rule, courts will continue to allow it to hide
behind the rule when faced with future antitrust challenges. As such, while
this is definitely a step in the right direction, the NCAA has to get rid of its
Amateurism Rule if it wishes to end all corruption occurring at colleges and
universities.

222. NCAA responds to California Senate Bill 206, NCAA (Sept. 11, 2019, 10:08 AM),
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/ncaa-responds-california-senate-bil
l-206.
223. Ben Pickman, NCAA Votes to Start Process Permitting Athletes to Benefit from
Likeness, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 29, 2019, 11:44 AM), https://www.si.com/college/2
019/10/29/ncaa-student-athlete-likeness-permitted-vote.
224. Id.
225. The NCAA’s Amateurism Rules are Indeed Madness, supra note 10.

